Cosmology
From its Greek etymology (kósmos world; lógos,
knowledge or science) the word cosmology means the science of the
world. It ought, therefore, to include in its scope the study of the
whole material universe: that is to say, of inorganic substances, of
plants, of animals, and of man himself. But, as a matter of fact,
the wide range indicated by the etymology of the word has been
narrowed in the actual meaning. In our day cosmology is a branch of
philosophical study, and therefore excludes from its investigation
whatever forms the object of the natural sciences. While the
sciences of physics and biology seek the proximate causes of
corporal phenomena, the laws that govern them, and the wonderful
harmony resulting therefrom, cosmology aims to discover the deeper
and remoter causes which neither observation nor experiment
immediately reveals. This special purpose restricts in many ways the
field of cosmology. There is another limitation not less important.
Man's unique position in the universe makes him the object of a
special philosophical study, viz. psychology, or anthropology; and,
in consequence, that portion of the corporeal world with which these
sciences deal has been cut off from the domain of cosmology properly
so called.
There is a tendency at present to restrict the field still
further; and limit it to what is known as inorganic creation.
Psychology being by its very definition the study of human fife
considered in its first principle and in the totality of its
phenomena, its investigations ought to comprise, it would seem, the
threefold life of man, vegetative, animal, and rational. And,
indeed, the inter-dependence of these three lives in the one living
human being appears to justify the enlargement demanded nowadays by
many authors of note for the psychological field. Hence for those
who accept this view, cosmology has nothing to do with organic life
but is reduced to "a philosophical study of the inorganic world".
Such, in our opinion, is the best definition that can be given. At
the same time it should be remarked that many philosophers still
favour a broader definition, which would include not only the
mineral kingdom but also living things considered in a general way.
In German-speaking countries cosmology, as a rule, is known as
Naturphilosophie, i.e. philosophy of nature.
Under this name, philosophers usually understand a study of the
universe along the lines of one of the foregoing definitions.
Scientists, on the other hand, give a more scientific turn to this
philosophy of nature, transforming it into a sort of general physics
with an occasional excursion into the realm of sensitive and
intellectual life. A notable instance is the work of Prof. Ostwald,
"Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie" (Leipzig, 1902).
ORIGIN OF COSMOLOGY
The word itself is of recent origin. It was first used by Wolff
when, in 1730, he entitled one of his works "Cosmologia Generalis"
(Frankfort and Leipzig). In this treatise the author studies
especially the laws of motion, the relations that exist among things
in nature, the contingency of the universe, the harmony of nature,
the necessity of postulating a God to explain
the origin of the cosmos and its manifestation of purpose. Because
of the advance the natural sciences were then making, Wolff omitted
from his philosophic study of nature the purely scientific portion
which till then had been closely allied with it. The cosmology of
the ancients and especially of Aristotle was
simply a branch of physics. The "Physics" of Aristotle
treats of corporeal beings in as far as they are subject to motion.
The work is divided into two parts:
- General physics, which embraces the general principles
governing corporeal being. It treats of local motion and its
various kinds; the origin of substantial compounds; changes in
quality; changes in quantity by increase and decrease; and changes
arising from motion in place, on which Aristotle
hinges our notions of the infinite, of time, and of space.
- Special physics which deals with the various classes of
beings: terrestrial bodies, celestial bodies, and man.
It
is the first part of this work that comes nearest to what we mean by
cosmology. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, as a rule, follow the
path marked out for them by Aristotle.
Cosmological subjects, properly so called, have no reserved place in
philosophical study, and are generally treated as a part of physics.
In our own time, philosophers employ the words "cosmology" and
"philosophy of nature" to designate the philosophic study of the
corporeal world.
METHOD
Cosmology is the natural complement of the special sciences. It
begins where they leave off, and its domain is quite distinct from
theirs. The scientist determines the immediate cause of the
phenomena observed in the mineral or the organic world: he
formulates their laws, and builds these into a synthesis with the
help of certain general theories, such as those of light, of heat,
and of electricity. The cosmologist, on the other hand, seeks the
ultimate causes, not off this or that class of beings or of
phenomena, but of the whole material universe. He inquires into the
constituent nature of corporeal beings, their destiny, and their
first cause. It is clear that these larger problems are quite beyond
the range and purpose of the various sciences, each of which is by
its method confined to its own particular subject. Nevertheless,
cosmology must borrow, and borrow largely, from the data of science,
since the causes which it studies are not directly perceptible; they
can be known only through phenomena which are their more or less
faithful manifestations. It is on these that cosmology must rest in
order to pass upward from cause to cause till the ultimate cause is
reached. Since, then, it is the role of the natural sciences to
analyze and classify the properties and phenomena of nature,
cosmology is obliged to draw very freely upon those sciences and to
neglect none of their definitive results. In a word, the
cosmological method is essentially a posteriori. Descartes and
his school followed a different, even an opposite, course. Being a
mathematician above all else, he applies to cosmology the principles
of mathematics, and as mathematics sets out from the simplest
propositions and travels along the road of deduction to the most
complex truths, so Descartes, starting from extension as the
primordial and universal property of matter, in fact its very
essence, ends by ascribing to all bodies in nature whatever
extension implies and by eliminating from them whatever it excludes.
This a priori method, being essentially deductive is
anti-scientific; and is based, moreover, on a false supposition,
since extension is only one of the many properties of matter, not
its essence. As Leibniz
pointed out, extension presupposes something extended, just as a
repetition presupposes something to be repeated. Philosophers,
therefore, have almost entirely abandoned this method; with the
exception perhaps of the Idealistic Pantheists of whom we shall
speak presently.
DIVISION OF
COSMOLOGY
Cosmology, as most philosophers understand it, has a threefold
problem to solve: Whence this corporeal world? What is it? Why is
it? Hence its three parts, concerned respectively with
- the primordial efficient cause of the cosmos;
- its actual constituent causes;
- its final cause.
The first cause of the material universe
Geology, go back as it may and as far as it may in the scientific
history of the earth, must ever remain face to face with a fact that
calls for explanation, viz. the existence of matter itself. Even if
it could decisively prove Laplace's hypothesis, according to which
all portions of this universe, earth, sun, and the whole stellar
system, originally made up a single nebular class, there would still
remain the very reasonable question, whence came this mass and what
was its origin? Now this is precisely the question cosmology asks;
and in seeking the answer it has riven rise to many systems which
can always be brought under one of the following headings:
(a) Monism;
(b) the theory of Transitive
Emanation;
(c) Creationism.
(a) Monism
The Monist theory is that all beings in the world are but one and
the same necessary and eternal substance having within itself the
sufficient reason of its existence; while the seeming diversity of
things and their attributes, are but the various manifestations and
evolutions of this single substance. Pantheism
identifies the world with the Divine Being. This Being is
ceaselessly in process of evolution; which, however, in no wise
disturbs the universal identity of things. The Pantheist is either
an Idealist or a Realist according to the view he takes of the
nature and character of the original substance. If that substance is
real he is styled a Realist, and such were Erigena, Amalric, David
of Dinant, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza. But if the original
substance is something ideal, e.g. the Ego, the Absolute, the
Concept, he is styled an idealist, and such were Hegel, Schelling,
and Fichte. Kraus and Tiberghien support the Pantheistic view: God is in the
world and the world is in God, although
they are not identical. Schopenhauer devised a form of Pantheism
which is known as Panthelism. According to his view the motive force
of the whole universe is a single blind will. Hartmann goes a step
farther and says the world is but the constant evolution of the
unconscious: hence the name Panhylism. Modern Materialists, such as
Büchner, Häckel, Baruch, as well as the old Greek Atomists,
Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, consider all the activities of
the universe as so many purely material phenomena arising from one
necessary and eternal substance. Lastly, according to the supporters
of the Immanent Emanation theory, the Divine Being develops within
itself so that it is continually identifying itself with the beings
it evolves, or that come forth from it, just as the grub maintains
its substantial identity throughout its transformation into
chrysalis and butterfly. It is clear that such a theory hardly
differs from Pantheism
(b) Transitive Emanation
In the Transitive Emanation theory all beings issue from the
Divine Substance much in the same way as new fruits appear on the
parent tree without changing its substance and without diminishing
its productive power.
(c) Creationism
Creationism is the view held by the generality of spiritualistic
philosophers. The universe through its endless transformations
reveals its contingency: that is to say, its existence is not a
necessity: therefore it must have received its existence from some
other being. This first cause must be a necessary and independent
one, unless we admit an infinite series of dependent causes and so
leave unsolved the problem of the world's existence. God has,
therefore, drawn all things from nothingness by the free act of His
Almighty Will; in a word, He has made them out of nothing, since any
other explanation, e.g. Emanationism, which implies a real intrinsic
change in God, is
incompatible with the immutability, necessity, and absolute
perfection of the Divine Being.
The constituent causes of the world
The composition of corporeal beings is also the subject of much
discussion. There are actually four systems of note, each promising
to solve this delicate problem: Mechanism; Hylomorphism (the
Scholastic system); Dynamic Atomism; and Dynamism proper.
(a) Mechanism
The characteristic tendency of Mechanism, i.e. of the mechanical
theory, is to disregard all qualitative difference in natural
phenomena and to emphasize their quantitative differences. That is
to say, in this system the constituent matter of all corporeal
beings is everywhere the same and is essentially homogeneous; all
the forces animating it are of the same nature; they are simply
modes of local motion. Furthermore, there is no internal principle
of finality; in the world everything is determined by mechanical
laws. To explain all cosmic phenomena, nothing is needed but mass
and motion; so that all the differences observable between corporeal
beings are merely differences in the amount of matter and motion.
Mechanism appeals especially to the law of the correlation of forces
in nature and of the mechanical equivalent of heat. Heat, we know,
does work; but it consumes itself in proportion to its own activity.
In like manner mechanical causes produce heat and grow weaker in
proportion to the intensity of their effect. So it is with all
corporeal energy; one form may be substituted for another, but the
quantity of the new force will be always equivalent to the quantity
of the force that has disappeared. Having in this way identified
mechanical force with motion, the holders of this theory felt
authorized to unify all forces and reduce them to local motion; and
it was then an easy step to consider substance as homogeneous since
its only use is to serve as a background for phenomena. Other
arguments are drawn from chemistry, especially from the facts of
isomerism, polymerism, and allotropism.
The mechanical theory is of ancient origin. Amongst its earliest
partisans were Thales, Anaximander, and Heraclitus, whose chief
concern was to prove the derivation of the world from one simple
primitive substance. Empedocles, however, held out for four
elements--air, earth, water, fire. But Democritus, and later
Epicurus, suppressed this distinction between the elements,
proclaimed the essential homogeneity of matter, and referred the
variety of natural phenomena to differences of motion. After the
time of Epicurus (270 B.C.), this system disappeared from
philosophical thought for eighteen centuries. Restored by Descartes
it soon won the favour of most scientists, and it is still dominant
in scientific research. The Cartesian philosophy was a restatement
of the two basic principles of the old theory, the homogeneity of
nature and the reduction of all forces to terms of motion; but it
got new vigour by contact with the natural sciences, especially
physics and chemistry; hence the name Atomism (q.v.) by which
it is usually known. It should, however, be noted that there are two
Atomisms, the one purely chemical, the other philosophical.
According to the former all simple bodies are made up of atoms, i.e.
of particles so small that no chemical force known to us can divide
them, but which have all the properties of visible bodies. Atoms
form groups of two or four or sometimes more; these small tenacious
groups, known as chemical molecules coalesce in physical molecules,
and from these in turn are built up the material bodies we see
around us. The material body thus results from a progressive
aggregation of molecules, and the very smallest portion of it that
is endowed with the properties of the compound contains many atoms
of various species, since by definition the compound results from
the union of numerous elements. On this atomic theory, independent
as such of all philosophical systems, was grafted during the last
century that philosophical Atomism which, while ascribing to all
atoms the same nature, differentiates them only by varying amounts
of mass and motion.
(b) Dynamism
Another explanation of the material world is offered by Dynamism.
If Mechanism attributes extension to matter and complete passivity
to corporeal substances, Dynamism sees in the world only simple
forces, unextended, yet essentially active. There is nothing strange
in the antithesis of these two systems. The Dynamism of Leibniz--it
was he who propounded it--was but a reaction against the Mechanism
of Descartes. To these two matrix-ideas of unextended, active forces
the majority of Dynamists add the principle of actio in
distans. They soon found out that points without extension can
touch only by completely merging the one with the other, and on
their own hypothesis the points in contact would amount to nothing
more than a mathematical point which could never give us even the
illusion of apparent extension. To avoid this pitfall, the Dynamists
bethought them of considering all bodies as aggregates of force
unextended indeed but separated by intervals from one another.
Conceived by Leibniz, who held the monads to be dowered with all
immanent activity, this system has been amended and modernized by
Father Boscovich, Kant, Father
Palmieri, Father Carbonelle, Hirn, and Father Leroy. On the whole it
has found few supporters; scientists as a rule prefer the mechanical
view. It would seem, however, that a reaction towards it has set in
since the discovery of the radioactivity of matter. The property
manifested by a considerable number of bodies of emitting at
ordinary temperatures a seemingly inexhaustible quantity of electric
rays suggests the idea that matter is a focus of energy which tends
to diffuse itself in space. But in point of fact there are only two
arguments in favour of Dynamism. One is drawn from the difficulties
of grasping the concept of extension; the other from the fact that
all we know of matter comes to us through its action on our organs
of sense; hence the inference that force is the only thing existing
apart from ourselves.
(c) Hylomorphism
Between these two extremes stands the Scholastic theory, known as
Hylomorphism, or theory of matter and form (húle, matter;
morphé, form), also as the Aristotelean
theory, and later as the Thomistic theory from the name of its
principal defender in the Middle Ages. Aristotle
(384-322 B.C.), who was its author, gave it a large place in his
treatises on physics and on metaphysics. It was discussed during
centuries in the Peripatetic and neo-Platonic schools and in the
schools of Constantinople and Athens; but from the sixth century to
the twelfth, though its essential principles survived, it was an
insignificant factor in philosophic thought. An exception, however,
must be made in favour of Avicenna in the East (980-1037) and of
Averroes in Spain (1126-1198), both famous commentators on the Aristotelean
encyclopedia. In the thirteenth century, the Golden Age of
Scholasticism, the system was restored, thanks to a number of Latin
translations, and its long-forgotten treasures were brought to light
by daring prospectors, such as Alexander of
Hales, St.
Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas
Aquinas, St.
Bonaventure, and Henry of
Ghent. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the
cosmological theory, and indeed the whole Scholastic system,
suffered a decline which lasted till the nineteenth century, though
during the interval it found ardent supporters in some of the
religious orders. The restoration movement began about the middle of
the nineteenth century with the works of Kleutgen (1811-1883);
Sanseverino (1811-1865), and Liberatore (1810-1892); but it was
especially owing to the impulse given it by the famous Encyclical of
Leo XIII, "Æterni Patris" (1879), that Scholasticism regained its
place of honour beside the great modern systems.
The Scholastic theory can be summed up in the following
propositions:
- Bodies both elementary and compound have an essential unity;
they differ specifically, and are by their very nature extended;
- they possess powers or energies both passive and active which
spring from their substantial nature and are inseparable from it;
- they have an immanent tendency toward certain special ends to
be realized by the exercise of their native energies.
The
basic principle of this cosmology is that of immanent finality. The
corporeal world is a masterpiece of order and harmony. In spite of
ceaseless transformations, every species of body, simple and
composite alike, reappears again and again with its characteristic
properties to further the well-being of the individual and of the
universe as a whole. Now this constant and harmonious co-operation
of innumerable causes acting under conditions the most diverse can
only be explained, say the Scholastics, by admitting in the material
agents themselves fixed and permanent principles of order. The
universe must therefore be composed of specific natures, i.e. of
beings which by their constitution and properties are really adapted
to the ends they have to attain. Substance and its distinctive
energies form a whole which is completely subordinated to its
appointed destiny; so that if serious alterations, such as chemical
combinations, succeed in affecting these properties and in marring
the harmony that ought to exist between them and their substantial
base, the being so affected must put on a new nature in harmony with
its new state. There takes place, in other words, what the
Scholastics call a substantial transformation. But this implies that
an essential portion of the original being must persist throughout
the change, and be carried over into the final result, otherwise
transformation would involve the annihilation of the first being and
the production of the second out of nothing. On the other hand, if
we hold that during the process the being in question does not lose
its own specific difference in exchange for another, it would be
illogical to speak of a transformation, since a change which
preserves the substantial integrity of the being can never have as
its result the production of a new being. All bodies, then, that are
subject to such a change must contain, in spite of their unity, two
constituent principles. The one is a specifying or determining
principle whence spring the actuality and distinguishing marks of
the body itself; and it is this principle which is born and dies at
every step in the deeper transformations of matter. It is called
substantial form. The other, the indeterminate complement of this,
is the substratum which receives the various essential forms; and it
is called first matter. These are the fundamental ideas in the
Scholastic theory.
As a system it is not at every point the direct antithesis of the
two other systems outlined above. It is true that, while Mechanism
claims that the properties of bodies are nothing but local motion,
the Scholastics admit the existence of qualities properly so called
in all bodies, i.e. accidental determinations, fixed and destined
for action. These properties are generated with the new substance;
they cling to it indissolubly during its existence and they are its
natural manifestation. But, on the other hand, the Scholastics
concede to the mechanical theory that local motion plays a large
part in the world, that it is the accompaniment and the measure of
every exertion of material force. Hence they give Mechanism credit
for assigning a quantitative value to the phenomena of nature by
measuring the movement proportionate to each; while, on their side,
they explain the activity at work in each case by taking into
account the qualitative elements as well as the kinetic. Again, with
the mechanical theory the Scholastic recognizes in every corporeal
being an essential principle of passivity, of inertia, divisibility,
and extension--in a word, of all the properties so highly prized by
Mechanism; this principle is first matter. But the Scholastic theory
adds a substantial form, i.e. a determining principle and a
root-cause of the activities and peculiar tendencies displayed by
each individual body.
A similar partial agreement exists between Scholasticism and
Dynamism. In the hylomorphic constitution of bodies the dynamic
element has a preponderating role, represented by the substantial
form; but since the corporeal being does not appear to be a source
of energy pure and simple, the dynamic element is joined with first
matter, of which passivity and extension are the natural outcome.
(d) Dynamic Atomism
A fourth and last system is called Dynamic Atomism. The only real
difference between it and Mechanism lies in the fact that it
attributes to bodies forces distinct from local motion; but at the
same time it maintains that they are purely mechanical forces.
Matter, it asserts, is homogeneous and the atom incapable of
transformation. This theory, proposed by Martin and Tongiorgi, and
upheld nowadays by certain scientists, is a transition between the
mechanical and the Scholastic system. Its partisans, in fact, are
persuaded that a theory which denies the reality of qualitative
energies inherent in matter and reduces them to local motion thereby
makes the true explanation of natural phenomena impossible and hands
over the universe to the whims of chance. Some Dynamists, therefore,
to meet the obvious requirements of order in the world, seek in
substance itself the reasons of its secondary principles of
activity. But in this hypothesis it seems rather hard not to admit,
as the Scholastics maintain, that diversity of substance is the only
explanation of the constancy observed in the accidental differences
of things.
The final cause of the material universe
The last problem that cosmology attempts to solve is that of the
final cause. It is intimately bound up with that of the first cause.
Materialists like Hackel and Büchner, who refuse to see in the
universe a plan or a purpose, can assign no goal to cosmic
evolution. In their opinion, just as the world, during its eternal
past, has undergone countless variations in form, so during its
eternal future it is destined to ceaseless change. The laws of
mechanics, the chance encounter of atoms and molecules, the
capricious play of natural forces following no preconceived aim,
will determine the number, nature, and form of the states through
which matter is to pass. Pantheists and all who identify God with
matter share as a rule the same view. For them the condition of the
world is but the fatal result of purposeless evolution; so that the
world is its own end or rather is itself the term of its existence
and activity.
Those who believe in the existence of a
personal God can never admit that an all-wise being created
without a purpose. And since a perfect and independent being can
have no other than himself as the final aim of his action, it
follows that the ultimate end of creation is to manifest the glory
of the Creator, man being the intermediary, and, as it were, the
high-priest of the material world. The welfare of man himself is the
secondary purpose of creation. According to St. Thomas the world is
a vast hierarchy of which inorganic matter is the base and man the
summit. The mineral order ministers to the vegetable and this in
turn to the animal, while man finds in all these the satisfaction of
his needs and the adornment of his earthly life. Above all he finds
in the material universe and in the service it renders him a means
of rising to perfect happiness in the possession of God.
D. NYS
Transcribed by Rick McCarty
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume
IV
Copyright © 1908 by Robert Appleton Company
Online
Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
Nihil Obstat.
Remy Lafort, Censor
Imprimatur. +John M. Farley,
Archbishop of New York
